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Abstract 
 
Considering the increasing importance of the development assistance, further thought needs to be given 
to its impacts on governance of fisheries and aquaculture in developing countries. From West African 
and South-East Asian examples, three of the main axes of the development assistance can be identified: 
the increase in small-scale fishing capacity, the connection to the export markets, the small-scale 
aquaculture development. Some impacts of this assistance can be pointed out: the setting up of a large 
small-scale capacity or overcapacity, the increasing dependence on export markets and the decrease in 
food security in West Africa, the damage to environment linked to small-scale shrimp aquaculture 
development in South-East Asia. 
 
By privileging these axes of development, the assistance contributes to the emergence or to the 
maintenance of governance systems which pose some problems. The problems relating to fisheries 
governance systems can be mentioned as follows: the fisheries governance limited to fisheries 
management, the weakening of the public power and public actions, the fragmentation of the fisheries 
administration and civil society. These problems are amplified by the development assistance and they 
contribute to some breaches of good governance principles of which we give some examples. 
 
Some lessons can be drawn from the analysis of fisheries governance systems which have been 
encouraged by the development assistance: a need for a new approach of the fisheries governance which 
lies beyond the framework of the fisheries management, the obligation of an integration of fisheries or 
aquaculture development assistance programmes into national and regional public policies, the necessary 
rehabilitation of the fisheries administration and the strengthening of institutions. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
1. The development assistance for the fisheries and aquaculture sector is bilateral, multilateral and is 
also provided at European level. Among others, several instruments can be mentioned like grants, risk capital, 
loans to the private sector. 
 
2.  The bilateral assistance emanates from development cooperation agencies funded by many 
developed countries. We can mention, among others, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 
which carries its effort on the South and South-East Asia and on Africa, the USAID, the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA), the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) which 
act all over the world, and further more the Department for International Development (DFID) from United 
Kingdom, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), the Agence Française pour le 
Développement (AFD). Recent development indicates a priority orientation of the funding, which 
1 This paper has been prepared by Mr. Jean-Yves Weigel of the Institut de Recherche et Développement (UMR 
n°63 IRD/Université de Versailles Saint-Quentin en Yvelines), France, Email: weigeljy@ird.fr. The original 
paper was written in French. 
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is, on the one hand, the small-scale fishing within the framework of Poverty Reduction Strategies in Sub-
Saharan Africa and, on the other hand , the sustainable aquaculture in South East Asia. 
 
3.  The multilateral assistance comes primarily from the World Bank in particular through the 
International Development Association (IDA), from the International Fund for Agriculture Development 
(IFAD), the Global Environment Facility, the Asian Bank of Development, the African Bank of 
Development, the Inter-American Development Bank etc... One can also classify, as international assistance, 
that coming from NGOs, as IUCN or WWF, which are very active regarding the preservation of biodiversity 
and fisheries resources. The multilateral assistance has been directed for a long time towards the development 
of an industrial fishing capacity, the construction of harbour infrastructures or processing plants. For the last 
few years, one has noted a reorientation towards the institutional support and the integrated ecosystem or 
fisheries management, in particular in association with the Global Environment Facility. 
 
4.  The European Development Fund (EDF) is a major instrument of the European Commission for 
development assistance to ACP countries (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific). The Ninth EDF has been allocated 
over the period 2000-2007 following the Cotonou Agreement. The fisheries development assistance provided 
by the EDF forms part of a broader European framework. In particular, the funds of the Commission’s 
general budget may be used for certain types of aid, and some funds of the European Investment Bank are 
also allocated to the development assistance. Last but not least, let us quote, the royalties paid by EU within 
the framework of fisheries access agreements. From a general point of view, besides fisheries access 
agreements, the European development assistance is focused on small-scale fishery and on the sanitary 
improvement of packaging and processing for export. 
 
5.  Considering the increasing importance of development assistance, further thought needs to be given 
to its impacts on governance of fisheries and aquaculture in developing countries. From West African and 
South-East Asian examples, three of the main axes of the assistance can be identified: the increase in small-
scale fishing capacity, the connection to the export markets, the small-scale aquaculture development. 
 
6.  In the first part of this paper, we shall point out some impacts of this assistance: the setting up of a 
large small-scale capacity or overcapacity, the increasing dependence on export markets and the decrease in 
food security in West Africa, the damage to environment linked to small-scale shrimp aquaculture 
development in South-East Asia. 
 
7.  By privileging these axes of development, the assistance contributes to the emergence or to the 
maintenance of governance systems which pose some problems. In a second part, we shall mention the 
problems relating to fisheries governance systems: the fisheries governance limited to fisheries management, 
the weakening of the public power and public actions, the fragmentation of the fisheries administration and 
civil society. These problems are amplified by development assistance and they contribute to some breaches 
of good governance principles of which some examples are provided. 
 
8.  In a third part, some lessons from the analysis of fisheries governance systems which were and 
which are encouraged by the development assistance will be drawn: a need for a new approach of the fisheries 
governance which lies beyond the framework of the fisheries management, the obligation of an integration of 
fisheries or aquaculture development assistance programmes into national and regional public policies, the 
necessary rehabilitation of the fisheries administration and the strengthening of institutions. 
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2. Some impacts of development assistance 
 
9. Three of the main axes privileged by the development assistance have been identified. 
 
10.  The first one is the increase in the capacity of small-scale fisheries. The donors have justified this 
assistance by the positive effects of small-scale fisheries on the creation of jobs and the redistribution of 
fisheries’ incomes among a larger number of economic agents. According to West African examples, the 
impact of this setting up and the problems which it induces can be put forward: the creation of a large small-
scale fishing capacity.  
 
11.  The second axis has been the connection to export markets. This connection resulted in an 
exponential growth of fish exports, but also in a stagnation or a reduction in the supply to national markets. 
According to the same examples, it is possible to determine the impact of this connection: an increasing 
dependence on export markets and a decrease in food security. 
 
12.  The third axis is the small-scale aquaculture development. It is in Southeast Asia that this 
assistance is very successful from an economic point of view, especially in regard to shrimp aquaculture. It is 
this example, and more particularly that of Thailand, than we retained to show the negative impacts of 
assistance on the environment. 
 
2.1. The setting up of a large small-scale fishing capacity or overcapacity 
 
13.  The development assistance contributed mainly to the exponential growth of the capacity of small-
scale fisheries during the last three decades. In West Africa, this assistance took the form of projects 
primarily. As far as Mauritania is concerned: the Project Coastal Fisheries funded by the Japan International 
Co-operation Agency (JICA) or the Project of Development of Small-scale Fisheries in the South (PDPAS) 
funded by the Agence Française pour le Développement (AFD). As far as Senegal is concerned: one can 
mention projects funded during the last decade by the European Development Funds (EDF), AFD or JICA: 
the Project of development of small-scale fisheries on the Petite Côte (PAPEC) and the PAMEZ Project of 
development of small-scale fisheries in Ziguinchor (PAMEZ) former to the PROPAC Project of support to 
the professionals of small-scale fisheries in Casamance (PROPAC) and to the Project of support of small-
scale fisheries in the South (PAPA-Sud). As far as Gambia is concerned: the Fisheries Development Project 
of the African Bank of Development (ADB). As far as Guinea-Bissau is concerned: Projecto de 
Desenvolvimentao da Pesca Artesanal Avançada funded by ADB or in the past the Project of Development of 
Small-scale Fisheries in the Bijagos Archipelago funded by the Swedish International Development Agency 
(SIDA). As far as Guinea is concerned: the Project of Development of Small-scale Fisheries funded jointly by 
the ADB and AFD, the Project of the Fish Market of Kénien and the Project for the Rehabilitation of the 
Fishing Port of Boulbinet funded by JICA. 
 
14.  Thus, in West Africa, small-scale fisheries are in full expansion and are accompanied by a 
colonization of the whole coast with the opening, for ten years, of new fisher settlements such as in Guinea-
Bissau or in Mauritania. For all of the countries of the Sub-Regional Fishery Commission (SRFC), from 
Sierra-Leone to Mauritania including Cape Verde, the number of small scale fishing units can be estimated at 
30 000 including 60% of motorized canoes for a production of 600 000 tons. The development assistance 
subsidises the motorization, the purchase of fishing gears, the working capital of fishing units, but also the 
fish trade and packaging for exports to the European and Asian markets. It also subsidises the infrastructures 
such as peers and roads. Thus, the development assistance influences the profitability of 
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fishing units by encouraging an increase in the fishing effort 
2
..
 
Lastly, the low costs of the labour force and 
the frequent multi-activity of the fishers also explain the profitability of small-scale fishing units. 
 
15.  The example of Mauritania illustrates the increase in the capacity of small-scale fisheries. In 2003 
the number of small scale fishing boats (pirogues) was 3 700 harvesting at a 80 000 ton estimate by Institut 
Mauritanien de Recherches Océanographiques et des Pêches (IMROP). Of this total, the pelagics would 
represent 25 000 tons (mainly small pelagics) intended primarily for the domestic market. The species with 
strong commercial value, demersal fishes and cephalopods, would represent 55 000 tons intended for the 
European and Asian markets. The Mauritanian small-scale fisheries experienced a spectacular development as 
the number of pirogues quadrupled between 1991 and 1997. But it is starting from the end of the 90s and the 
actions carried out within the framework of the strategy of fishery sector management and development of 
1998 that, thanks to the contribution of donors, the small-scale fisheries experienced a very significant 
development: the number of fishermen estimated at 3 000 in 1991to 12 000 in 2001 (MPEM, 2003). Currently 
33 000 direct and indirect jobs would be generated by small-scale fisheries (MPEM, 2005). From now on, one 
of the main constraints of Mauritanian small-scale fisheries is the lack of control of the fishing capacity. 
Indeed, as in all of the West African countries, one can put forward a gap between the legislation and its 
application. On the legal level, the control of fishing capacity is made possible by the Law 2000-025 bearing 
Code of Fishing and by its decree of application 2002-073. Generally, the fishing rights belonging to the State 
are conceded in the form of licenses, in particular a small-scale fishing license and a coastal fishing license. 
This system is applied in the case of coastal fishing, and very partially in the case of small-scale fishing, 
because the registration by the Merchant Navy Services is not complete, is lacking in simplicity and does not 
yet refer to the management plans per type of fishery. 
 
16.  Thus the development assistance contributed to create a high level of small-scale fishing capacity 
which, in certain cases, can be regarded as an overcapacity given the overexploitation and even the risk of 
extinction of some stocks targeted by small-scale fisheries. (CECAF, 2004; FAO, 2003). However, the 
reduction of an overcapacity of small-scale fisheries poses specific problems which are difficult to solve, 
especially in the developing countries. 
 
17.  The first problem is connected with the measurement of small-scale fishing capacity and with the 
definition of relevant management units. “They are indeed difficulties associated with the collection of data as 
well as input-based or output-based measurements of capacity in such fisheries (e.g. the flexibility with which 
crafts involved can accommodate additional labour and shift from fishery to fishery). Difficulties also arise 
with regard to establishing target output and input levels. Fleet mobility constitutes one of the main 
difficulties encountered in measuring capacity and assessing overcapacity. Fleet mobility can relate to 
geographic mobility and/or the ability of vessels to redirect effort from one target stock to another in the same 
area. Thus capacity needs to be considered on a fleet basis as well as on a species or stock basis, with further 
consideration being given to the relevant geographic perspective (local, national, regional or global 
perspective according to fisheries). The key question is where to draw the line and, if starting from a stock 
perspective, how to define “latent capacity”. This question relates directly to the need to define fisheries as 
management units that are relevant to the management of fishing capacity.” (in Greboval, 2003: 10). Another 
difficulty raised by this author is relating to the necessary drawing up of a link between harvesting and 
processing capacity in the case of small-scale-fleets, because the catches of small-scale multispecific fleets 
are very frequently processed in different ways. It means that a relevant link can only be established at a fairly 
aggregated level. 
2 This increase induces a fall of catches per unit of effort but the profitability of the demersal small-scale 
fishery is ensured with constant raising prices compensating the decrease in the catch per unit of effort and the 
increase in the costs of inputs. 
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18.  The second problem relates to the economic and social costs of the transition to an appropriate 
fishing capacity through vessel decommissioning or redeployment of workers. These costs cannot be taken in 
charge by the developing countries budgets. The West African countries need technical and financial 
assistance to achieve an appropriate regulation of fishing capacity. But of course, a preliminary condition is to 
stop the development assistance directly or indirectly dedicated to an inappropriate increase in smallscale 
fishing capacity. 
 
2.2. The increasing dependence on export markets and the decrease in food security 
 
19.  The dependence of West African fisheries on export markets is illustrated by the importance of 
exports which represent more than 70% of the catches in the EEZs of countries of the Sub Regional Fishery 
Commission. During last two decades, the development assistance supported indirectly the connection to 
export markets by encouraging the deregulation and disengagement of the States in the name of the 
restoration of public finances and free market. But the development assistance also supported directly this 
connection when it funded projects for the setting up of fishing fleets targeting the exportable species or when 
it brought the packaging and processing factories into compliance with European or Japanese standards. 
Lastly, one of the methods of development assistance was the granting of tariff preferences by the European 
Economic Community, then the European Union, so as to encourage exports. 
 
20.  The deregulation initially touched the commercial transactions. Thus, the transactions relating to 
fishing and fish trade in Guinea-Bissau, codified with the promulgation of a very precise nomenclature and 
controlled by state-owned companies and central buying offices since Independence, have been gradually 
deregulated since 1987 in favour of fish traders. The deregulation was carried out also by the quasi-total 
abandonment by the States of a tariff policy, as shown by the abolition of export taxes for fishery products 
which have become effective since 1985 in Gambia. 
 
21.  The disengagement of West African States from the productive sector resulted first in the 
deactivation or the dismemberment of state-owned companies, then, in their privatisation in the name of the 
suppression of state monopoly. As an example, one can still quote Gambia with the progressive opening of 
fish marketing to private contractors and the progressive disengagement of the state-owned companies on all 
the levels of the fish chain, as well on the level of the freezing companies as on the level of the distribution of 
inputs and fishing gears. As an emblematic example of privatisation of a state-owned company, one can refer 
to the Société Mauritanienne de Commercialisation du Poisson (SMCP) created in 1984 within the 
framework of a nationalisation policy of fishery products marketing, and whose capital opening has been 
imposed since 1993. 
 
22.  The connection to the European market was supported by the granting of already old tariff 
preferences, dating from the Lome 2 and Lome 1 Convention which stipulated that the products coming from 
the ACP countries could be exported duty-free of customs to the European Economic Community. The Lome 
Conventions after 1985, as well as the Agreement of Cotonou in 2000, offered to ACP countries important 
financial means, through the European Development Funds (EDF), a part of which was used for promotion or 
setting health standards, in particular for the laboratories in charge with the certification and the export 
companies. These commercial privileges reinforce the competitiveness of West African exports towards the 
European Union attested by the maintenance of shares of market for certain products, and confer a significant 
comparative advantage on countries like Mauritania, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea or Guinea-Bissau. Main 
products exported towards Europe are demersal fishes, cephalopods and crustaceans. They are essentially 
chilled or frozen products but not having generally undergone any processing. As for connection to the Asian 
markets, it results mainly in exports of frozen cephalopods for the Japanese market, of dried ray and shark 
fins for the Chinese market. 
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 23. Three consequences of this dependence can be pointed out: 
 
� The first consequence is an increased fishing effort on demersal species which results in a fall of 
catches per unit of effort and a fast reduction in the biomass for certain species (Gascuel and 
Laurens, 2001). 
� The second consequence is a vulnerability with respect to the international commercial legislation 
insofar as the preferential treatment granted by the European Union to the ACP countries is disputed 
by World Trade Organisation (WTO). Indeed, the rules of WTO condemn this preferential 
treatment since the authorized advantages are not reciprocal and contravene the principle of non 
discrimination among countries having the same development level. 
� The third consequence is a reduction in food security. Indeed, with an export market offering better 
returns and being interested in buying fishery products in large quantities, a growing number of 
fishermen specialized in catches intended for domestic market turned to demersal coastal fishing. 
Thus, the conditions of a stagnation or even of a reduction in the fish supply for the domestic 
market are met. Another effect is the reduction of the supply to the traditional processing. (Dème 
and Dahou, 2001). However, the increase in population, with a doubling of the West African 
population every twenty five years, would require an increase in the availability of fish. But the 
relative increase in catches in West African countries in a context of reduction of the abundance of 
certain species and increase in exports did not compensate for increase in population. This explains, 
globally, a reduction of availability of fish per capita in the countries of the SRFC when the fresh or 
traditionally processed fish is the principal source of proteins, in particular for the urban population. 
 
2.3. The damage to environment linked to small-scale shrimp aquaculture development 
 
24.  Over the past twenty five years, the small-scale shrimp culture has shown a remarkable expansion 
in Southeast Asia; since it represents the most important production system in term of hectares and farms. 
This expansion is due mainly to the mobilization of budgetary resources from national budgets, private 
investments, but also from the development assistance. 
 
25.  In the case of Thailand, the development assistance for the dissemination of shrimp culture mainly 
came from the South East Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC) funded by the Japanese 
Cooperation, from the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), and from the Taiwanese Cooperation. As 
early as 1973, technicians trained in Japan succeeded at a Department of Fisheries’s station in mastering the 
hatching and nursing of the Penaeus monodon and Penaeus merguiensis from spawners taken from the 
natural environment. One of the reasons for the success of shrimp culture dissemination was the incentive to 
the creation of joint ventures which allowed the transfer of sophisticated technologies. Some of these joint-
ventures obtained Board of Investment (BOI) fiscal privileges as well as facilities for the repatriation of 
profits. Another reason of this success was the implementation of financing plans, from 1985, enabling 
shrimp farmers to take advantage of soft loans. This policy was implemented through the nationalized Bank 
of Agriculture and Cooperatives (BAAC) and was accompanied by donors. But this policy and the 
development assistance were very production oriented, with few concerns for environmental degradation. 
(Weigel, 1994). 
 
26.  At the environmental level, the main impacts of the expansion of small-scale shrimp culture have 
been the encroachment of the mangrove forests, an increase in the salinity and acidity of soils, and pollution 
from the dumping of organic waste of aqua-cultural origin. These consequences can be observed in Thailand 
as well as in Malaysia, Vietnam and Indonesia. 
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27.  Besides the fact that shrimp culture takes up and modifies a large amount of space (most often 
mangrove forests, salt flats, rice paddy converted into ponds), it also consumes inputs in bulk, and thus 
actively contaminates and pollutes the soil. In particular, the construction of ponds on converted mangrove 
areas has a direct impact in that it leads to cutting down the forest cover. But, it can also have indirect effects. 
One of these may be the deterioration of the remaining mangrove forests in two conflicting ways, depending 
on the land and water flow configuration. First the accelerated water circulation caused by clearing part of the 
mangrove forests provokes leaching, and thus erosion and an increase in salinity and acidity. Secondly, 
preventing the free circulation of water by constructing numerous dikes, channels and canal induces the 
degradation of the mangrove forests. These changes in water circulation may have repercussion on the 
catches or even on the other forms of aquaculture practiced in the surrounding area. Another impact, the drop 
in the area’s productivity, stems from the fact that the ecological fish and crustaceans niches have become 
rare and are non longer of the same quality. The destruction of the mangrove forests, which is the nursery for 
numerous aquatic species also affects neighbouring fisheries (marine and estuarine catches). 
 
28.  The pollution generated by the expansion of small-scale shrimp culture is linked to the most 
widespread production system, which is the so-called "Taiwanese" production system. This system is 
characterized by high densities per hectare which require the addition of a proportionate amount of industrial 
feed, of veterinarian products to control pathogens or accelerate growth (antibiotics, anabolic steroids), the 
addition of chemicals to control acidity (liming or calcium or magnesium based soil), or fertilizer (nitrate, 
phosphate or potassium based fertilizer). In particular, these different additions may lead to eutrophication, a 
case of anoxia, and fish and crustacean mortality. And since one of the features of this form of aquaculture is 
the daily renewal of water, the pond has to be discharged into the immediate surroundings, and therefore 
pollution spreads through secretion. Thus, the spreading of polluted water not only has repercussions on other 
uses, such as the consumption of drinking water, and rice, fruit or vegetable cultivation, but also on coastal 
aquaculture itself. In an area where intensification is badly controlled by the large number of shrimp farmers 
practising excessive densities without a water treatment system, intensive aquaculture pollutes the farm itself 
because of the necessary water renewal (other extraaquaculture factors may also contribute). The pollution 
may, in turn, be the cause of epizootic diseases which the farmer will try to combat by administering 
inappropriate medication, which, in turn, will give rise to the shrimps’ resistance to antibiotics, ending up 
with significant mortalities. The outcome of this infernal cycle may well be the formation of a "moon 
landscape" of abandoned ponds like in the provinces along the Inner Gulf of Thailand (from Petchburi to 
Chachoengsao) at the beginning of the 1990’s. 
 
29.  The expansion of the small-scale shrimp culture was an undeniable economic success but it 
involved an environmental degradation which presently does not allow to conclude to the sustainability of 
this activity. The development assistance is partly responsible for this environmental un-sustainability. The 
challenge which has to be taken up by the development assistance is to perfect and spread mangrove friendly 
shrimp culture technique. A program sponsored by the SEAFDEC in collaboration with the Department of 
Fisheries of Thailand paves the way. The four components of this programme concern: the integrated physical 
and biological technologies for water recycling in shrimp farming, the mitigation measures of effluent from 
shrimp farming on mangrove and coastal resources, an evaluation of seawater irrigation for intensive marine 
shrimp farming, a study on mangrove plantation for enhancing natural food web in water recycle shrimp 
farm. (Platon, 2001). 
 
3. Some problems that the development assistance has given rise to in terms of governance 
 
30.  The development assistance has contributed to the emergence or to the maintenance of governance 
systems which pose some problems. In a context characterized by the setting up of a large small-scale fishing 
capacity, an increasing dependence on export markets and the decrease in food security, 
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the damage to environment linked to aquaculture, the problems relating to fisheries governance systems can 
be summarised as follows. 
 
� First, a limitation of the fisheries governance to fisheries management which has, as a 
consequence, a weak application of the regulations imposed by the fisheries management plans. 
 
� Secondly, a contribution to the weakening of the public power and public actions in a context of 
incompletion of the decentralization which makes it difficult for the States to exercise their role 
of arbitrator and guarantor. 
 
� Thirdly, a participation in the fragmentation of the fisheries administration and of the various 
communities involved in fishing, marketing or processing of fisheries products. These problems 
are initiated or amplified by the development assistance and they contribute to some breaches of 
good governance principles. 
 
3.1. The fisheries governance limited to fisheries management 
 
31.  The fisheries management plans bring only technical or economic solutions to problems which 
should be seen in terms of a balance of power among the stakeholders. It remains neglected contrary to the 
political economy or political science approach which includes confrontations among divergent interests. 
Thus, the fisheries management plans do not give sufficient attention to the relationships in terms of a balance 
of power which determines for a great part the way in which the socio-economic stakes are adapted and in 
which the norms are applied. The transverse interests based on strong collusions among fishers, fish traders 
and government officials, and materialized by official or semi-official transactions with the State, are not 
taken into account or to a small extent only. The limits of this approach explain the weak application of the 
recommended measures, for example in the Senegalese case where the catches are regularly listed but where 
the national fishing Code remains unapplied, or can even sometimes be contradicted by local regulations. 
 
32.  One can give some examples of the limits of this approach: the difficulty of treating the “de-
territorialisation” or relationship between immigrants and natives, or even the difficulty of taking into account 
the overlappings of fishing “territories” or fishing itineraries. 
 
33.  The fisheries management plans, which only rarely include the overlapping of various fishing 
“territories” or itineraries, have great difficulty taking into account the “de-territorialisation” of the fishing 
activity. For example, the management plans based on ecosystemic entities, integrate the fisher migrations or 
the organisational fluctuations with difficulty (such as the changes in the composition of fishing units) which 
often characterize the exploitation of fisheries resources in developing countries, all the more since the 
interdependences among fisheries make the establishment of territorial limits more and more complex. One 
can find this bias in some coastal management programmes promoted by the World Bank, such as in Senegal 
or in Guinea Bissau. 
 
34.  The management of such interdependencies represents one of the essential stakes of the 
governance which have to manage the interactions among groups, for example between the natives and 
immigrants. The excessive simplification of the relationship between these two groups does not take account 
of relations that they forged. Rather than to take the native/immigrant dichotomy as a starting point, often 
simplified to the extreme and not negotiated with the social groups themselves, it would be better to take into 
account the inequalities of access to resources. 
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35.  The fisheries management plans are focused on the understanding of the biological impact or even 
bio-economic or ecosystemic one. This restrictive approach does not integrate the consequences of an 
intensification of the exploitation in social, economic or political terms, such as the increase in the inequalities 
or as the redistribution of the value added. The management plans prove to be too sectorial and reduced to 
only one segment of the fish chain. 
 
36.  By modelling essentially the withholdings from ecosystems, the fisheries management approach 
promotes functions of control of fisheries based mainly on the catches. While characterizing too 
schematically, or even not at all, the modes of exploitation, this approach does not allow an analysis of 
stakeholder practices and finally the level of equity of governance systems. So, this formulation does not 
propose methods of reaching the objective of sustainability in either of its three components (environmental, 
economic and social). 
 
3.2. The weakening of the public power and public actions 
 
37.  As a consequence of the deregulation and the withdrawal of the States, the economic agents of the 
fish chain work in an environment characterized by a drastically reduced intervention of the public 
authorities, the downsizing of civil service and state structure. This context is also characterized by a 
contraction of government spending, resulting in the continuous drop in the public investment and in the 
subsidies to national development agencies. Thus, the successive structural adjustment plans restricted the 
economic role of the States to the follow-up of strategies initiated by the bilateral or multilateral development 
assistance, such as those relating to environment and sustainable development in Mauritania, to the setting up 
of agencies for the promotion of private investment (the Directorate-General for the Promotion of Private 
Investment in Guinea-Bissau), to the promulgation of legal and regulatory frameworks as Codes of 
Investment. 
 
38.  The reduction of instruments of intervention of the public authorities had to be compensated by a 
sustained policy of decentralization translated in the texts by a delegation of powers to local communities. 
Initiated by the international institutions then relayed by the bilateral co-operations, the policy of 
decentralization was imposed on all of the West African States accompanying, first, the Plans of Structural 
Adjustment Plans since two decades, and then, the construction of an état de droit during the democratic 
transition in Africa in the 1990’s. But, the policy of decentralization came up against a hesitation of States to 
delegate tax resources to the local communities. Insofar as it attributes very limited financial resources to the 
intermediate or local levels, this reform is limited to a decentralization of central government authorities and 
to the organisation of forums of dialogs between the local and national level. One can speak about a limited 
decentralisation (Galetti, 2002) since a real administration of local communities was not carried on as a 
whole, and that decentralization concerns only limited points of competence. The governance of the West 
African fisheries is strongly influenced by this particular institutional context of decentralization. Therefore, 
there is on one side a fisheries administration having a limited staff and budget at its disposal, and on the 
other side the local communities to which the resources necessary for the development of the fishermen 
organisations or social associations are not voluntarily or involuntarily allocated. 
 
39.  A fisheries governance which would be based on the top-down paradigm and mutual trust 
paradigm comes up, in the first place, against the absence of decentralization (as in Mauritania) or its 
incompletion (as in Senegal) materialized by the lack of the tax prerogatives to local communities. It comes 
up in the second place against the insufficiency of the process of devolving power away from administrative 
departments since the central State tends to monopolize all the strategic decisions, helped in that by its 
stranglehold on the tax resources. In the extreme case of Guinea Bissau, for historical reasons, the State has a 
vague desire to keep the population under supervision in collaboration with militant bodies and has shown 
until now a little concern as far as the progress of the devolving process is concerned. One 
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thus identifies badly the methods of measurements of compensation adapted for fishing communities 
undergoing important restrictions on the exploitation of fisheries resources. 
 
3.3. The fragmentation of the fisheries administration and civil society 
 
40.  The fragmentation of the administration is seen by the large numbers of the government authorities 
which intervene in the development and the regulation of the fish chain without establishing a hierarchical or 
functional link among them. This situation can be characterized as an “institutional superposition” insofar as 
many administrations combine their various competences in a compartmentalized way. The result is an 
entropy of the State administrations which contributes to the weakening of public actions. The fragmentation 
of the administration materialises in two manners. Firstly by a competition at the national level among 
ministries which leads to a compartmentalization of the projects in order to collect the funds of the 
international assistance. Secondly, by difficulties of coordination of government authorities at the local level. 
This fragmentation of the administration is a serious obstacle in the realization of an application plan of the 
vertical governance (top-down paradigm). It is also an obstacle for the promotion of a sustainable 
development policy, the administrations oscillating permanently between a conservationist approach and an 
approach guided by the objective of an economic development. 
 
41.  The fragmentation of the civil society is seen by the multiplication of socio-professional 
organisations, associations, national NGOs, which are the principal recipients of the development assistance 
to the detriment of the state structures and the public development agencies. The fish chains also are 
concerned by the promotion of socio-professional organisations and associations, which arise under various 
configurations: cooperatives, Economic Interest Groups (GIE), mutual insurance companies of savings and 
credit, national NGOs, social associations. The diversity of their objectives as well as their chronic difficulties 
to coordinate their activities, seriously undermines the horizontal governance (mutual trust paradigm). One 
notices frequently the difficulties of coordination between NGOs and associations which call into question the 
effectiveness of the consultation mechanisms. Two examples illustrate this fragmentation: that of Senegal 
with the multiplicity of the socio-professional organisations and that of Guinea-Bissau with the expansion of 
national NGOs and social associations. 
 
42.  The wide range of the fishers' socio-professional organisations, small-scale processors, fish traders 
is within the scope of the Senegalese context which is characterized by the seniority of the associative or 
community movement; for example, the Federation of Senegalese NGOs was recognized by the State in 1978. 
More recently, some of the main beneficiaries of the international assistance are the Economic Interest Groups 
(GIE) united within federations like for example FENAGIE - Pêche (Fédération Nationale des GIE de Pêche) 
and the mutual insurance companies of savings and credit. The GIE and mutual insurance companies are 
given financings by the bilateral co-operations, the French one with the Project of Development of Small-
scale Fisheries on the Petite Côte (PAPEC), the Canadian and Belgian ones with the Project of Support to the 
Mutual Insurance Companies of Savings and Credit in Senegal (PAMECAS). The GIE and mutual insurance 
companies also benefit from the international co-operation projects such as the Integrated Management 
Programme of the Marine and Coastal Resources (GIRMAC) funded by the World Bank. The GIE and mutual 
insurance companies are also funded by the international NGOs, such as the IUCN, or by the European 
NGOs, such as the Dutch NGO, NOVIB. 
 
43.  The expansion of the national NGOs in Guinea-Bissau takes us back to their function of 
structuring the socio-professional organisations and social associations. It is fed by the dominating role of the 
international NGOs which took note of the deficiency of the Bissau-Guinean State during last years. As an 
example of national NGOs active with the littoral or insular communities, in particular in the Archipelago of 
Bijagos, let us quote “Tiniguena”, “Tonjoron”, “Nantinyan”, ADIM, “Tankakan”, ADEMA, “Biligert”, 
FASPEBI, “Totokan”, “Tepenny”. As an example of the very active international or European NGOs, let us 
mention the IUCN and the FIBA for the first and SWISSAID and “Iles de la Paix”
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for the latter. The dominating role of the international NGOs explains a conservationist connotation which 
privileges actions where sustainable development is concerned, such as the creation of National parks, the 
promotion of participative management and techniques adapted to a sustainable exploitation, the development 
of the cultural heritage and the environmental animation. 
 
3.4. Some breaches of good governance principles 
 
44.  According to UNDP, the good governance is associated with the degree of application of five 
principles (UNDP, 1996). The first principle is that of legitimacy which is based on the participation and the 
consensus orientation. The second principle is that of direction which is based on a strategic vision including 
Sustainable Human Development. The third principle is that of performance based on the adequacy of 
institutions and processes to the needs of all stakeholders and on the efficiency. The fourth principle is that of 
accountability which is based on the obligation to give explanations to the public and to the institutional 
stakeholders in the transparency. The fifth principle is that of fairness which is based on the equity and the 
rule of law. 
 
45.  The analysis of the application of these principles to the governance of West African fisheries does 
not allow to conclude on a “good governance” because of: (i) the lack of negotiation and the relative 
inconsistency of the objectives of the development assistance (ii) the absence of the cost-benefit analyses 
done in terms of sustainability of fisheries resources exploitation or fisheries governance, (iii) the legal 
disorder as far as the rights of access to the fisheries resources and the delegations of powers are concerned, 
and (iv) the weakness of the specific financing of the governance measures. 
 
46.  The principle of legitimacy is not correctly applied if one refers to the lack of negotiation 
concerning the targets of the fisheries development assistance. In the deliberative governance approach, the 
application of the principle of legitimacy induces a mechanism of negotiation among stakeholders which 
guarantee the durability of decisions. To be accepted and to lead on to sustainable and easy to apply norms of 
fisheries resources exploitation, these decisions must lean on mechanisms of compensation. The necessary 
condition for compensation to materialize is to base the mechanism of negotiation on a pertinent analysis of 
the balance of power among the stakeholders. It is also the condition for the norms supposed to derive from 
this to be appropriated by the stakeholders and more generally by the communities. However the analysis of 
projects reveals on the one hand, the absence of a mechanism of negotiation, and on the other hand, a non-
existent or very brief presentation of the balance of power among stakeholders, including within the 
communities of fishers. 
 
47.  The non-application of the principle of direction refers to the relative inconsistency of the 
development assistance objectives. One can give two examples: the inconsistency between the objectives of 
increase in the capacity of small-scale fishing and that of the sustainable development, and the inconsistency 
between the objective of development of national chains and the signature of fisheries accesses agreements 
without obligation of unloading. 
 
48.  For more than twenty years, the donors, as the Japanese Co-operation, the French Co-operation, the 
European Union, the African Bank of Development, have massively financed the development of small-scale 
fisheries in the name of its induced effects on employment and food security. The implementation of these 
various projects led to an exponential growth of the small-scale fishing capacity, in particular on the periphery 
of marine protected areas. This assistance aimed at increasing the fishing capacity continues, in spite of full 
exploitation or overexploitation of certain stocks confirmed since the end of 1990 (Gascuel and Laurens, 
2001). This assistance continues whereas the donors mention a concern of sustainable development even if 
they prefer to express it in its economic and social components. This assistance continues and it is superposed 
on that focused on the marine protected marine areas and so it endangers the effect of these areas. Let us 
quote the financing of a long-range small-scale fishery on the 
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Petite Côte and in Casamance (Sénégal) which is a threat for the fisheries resources of the Saloum Delta 
Biosphere Reserve and Bolama-Bijagos Arquipelago Biosphere Reserve (Guinea-Bissau). The inconsistency 
between the objective of increasing the small-scale fisheries capacity and that of the sustainable development 
is particularly prominent as the same donor finances through one project an increase in the fishing capacity at 
the periphery of marine protected areas, and through another project the specific measures of monitoring of 
the fishing capacity which the donor contributed to create. 
 
49.  The objective of setting-up sectorial chains on a national scale as a means of accelerating the 
economic growth and redistribution of the wealth, is part of the Millennium Development Goals and the 
National Sustainable Development Strategies. The setting-up of fish chains goes through the unloading of 
catches and an industrial processing of demersal fishes and cephalopods, and the processing of small pelagics 
on shore. The stake is a repatriation of the value added and an industrialization of the sector. However, in 
West Africa almost all of the species with high commercial value are exported unprocessed in Europe and 
Japan; one is obliged to notice the absence of an industrialization of the fishery sector generating value added 
and employment. One of the reasons is the existence of fisheries access agreements which do not authorise 
unloading of the catches and in this way deprive the countries of the raw material likely to be processed. The 
fisheries accesses agreements do not facilitate the creation of national fish chains. Recall that for the countries 
which do not have a budget margin, the signature of fisheries access agreements with the European Union is 
in accordance with the structural adjustment plans which focuses on, at the instigation of the IMF and World 
Bank, the maximization of tax revenues imposed by budgetary concerns. 
 
50.  The principle of performance and accountability is not correctly applied insofar as there is no 
precise evaluation of the costs and benefits done in terms of sustainability of fisheries resources exploitation 
or fisheries governance. The absence of evaluation does not make it possible to guide the mechanisms of 
compensation essential for the initiatives of regulation of the resources exploitation. Without these 
evaluations, it is difficult to win acceptance for the adapted mechanisms of compensation and to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the management norms. The absence of setting up of periodic evaluation procedures does not 
permit to associate the various public and non-public organisations charged to implement the regulations of 
the access to fishing zones and fisheries resources. The lack of planning does not favour elaboration of 
collective decision mechanisms or permanent readjustments in order to materialize the objectives of 
sustainability over the long term. All measures specific to the fisheries sector are not, or slightly articulated 
with the broader measures concerning the littoral. This makes it difficult to have a global vision of the 
anthropogenic pressure and depredation of all of the renewable natural resources, for example in the case, 
where smoking of small pelagic species results in a deforestation of the mangrove. It is the lack of 
decentralization which mainly explains this fact. The absence of costs and benefits evaluations does not 
encourage the implication of all stakeholders which would allow them to collectively validate the objectives 
and to formulate together the new norms of the fisheries governance. Moreover, the lack of costs and benefit 
evaluations does not ensure the transparency of the fisheries governance since there is neither an assessment 
of the invested sums nor their use and their impact. 
 
51.  The non-application of the principle of fairness is evident given the legal disorganisation of the 
rights of access to the fisheries and the delegations of powers, and given the weakness of the specific 
financing of the measures of governance. 
 
52.  Concerning the rights of access, no inventory was practically carried out. The first negative 
consequence of this fact is that, the precondition to the recognition of rights, depending on the negotiated 
processes, namely a nomenclature of the rights of access, practically does not exist. However, in a certain 
manner, the establishment of this nomenclature in littoral and marine areas is less problematic than in the case 
of lands insofar as the rights of access to the first are obviously looser than to the second and are more the 
concern of the access to itineraries than access to territories (except for delta areas or estuaries). The 
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second consequence of this is that, in a West African context characterized by the diversity of groups 
exploiting the fisheries resources, the absence of a detailed categorization of stakeholders and practices as 
regards access to the resource (residents, users, small-scale activities, etc…) leads to an abusive 
schematisation in terms of autochthonous or immigrant communities. However, the legal organisation of the 
rights of access could not be based on the criterion of the “autochtony” considering the extreme overlapping 
of the modes of exploitation of fisheries, or on a territorial approach considering the “deterritorialisation” of 
fishing. In addition, the criterion of the autochtony can lead to the manipulation of an identity nature 
following the example of the rural land plan in Ivory Coast, where the census of the land rights brought about 
a great number of community conflicts in a situation of political instability (Chauveau and al.1998). The non-
application of the principle of fairness is confirmed by the absence of a legal organisation of the rights of 
access depending on socio-economic practices. This legal organisation could also have asobjective to 
formulate the statute law in a flexible way in order to include a certain number of community regulations 
having preserved their effectiveness. The principle of subsidiarity could guide this convergence between the 
two sources of law. 
 
53.  The non-application of the principle of fairness can also be explained by the lack of legal 
organisation of delegations of powers, whereas it is decisive to promote a coherent articulation between the 
devolved administrative departments in charge of fisheries and local communities. This objective claims that 
the State puts into practice a devolution of institutional and financial powers to devolved administrative 
departments as well as to local communities. The delegation of powers should relate to the management of 
conflicts which needs the creation of legal authorities of appeal close to the populations in order to fill up the 
present institutional gap. 
 
54.  The last reason of non-application of the principle of fairness is the weakness of the specific 
financing of governance measures concerning: (i) the preliminary consultations to produce the norms through 
procedural decision mechanisms which have a cost which must be included in the budget of the projects, (ii) 
the financing of compensations in response to the restrictions defined within the framework of a sustainable 
exploitation of fisheries resources since the application of these norms presents an opportunity cost for the 
social groups and a high direct social cost for certain populations, (iii) the costs of law enforcement, which 
can be high in situations where the means of production for the exploitation of the fisheries resources are of 
relatively high capital intensity. 
 
4. Lessons learned for better fisheries and aquaculture governance : some guidelines 
 
55.  Some lessons can be drawn from the analysis of fisheries governance systems which were and 
which are encouraged by development assistance: 
 
� First, a need for a new approach towards fisheries governance which goes beyond the framework of 
the fisheries management, so as to be able to take into account the power relationship between 
stakeholders and to propose methods for achieving the goals of the sustainable development 
(environmental, economic, social). 
 
� Secondly, work is needed on the integration of fisheries or aquaculture development assistance 
programmes into national and regional public policies in order to avoid a lack of coherence of the 
sectorial policies, knowing the multiplicity of projects and the compartmentalization between 
resources conservation policy and socio-economic development policy. 
 
� Thirdly, there is a need to rebuild the fisheries administration and strengthen the institutions to 
compensate for the weakening of the public authorities, and public actions, as well as for the 
fragmentation of this administration and of the civil society. This rehabilitation should allow a 
“requalification” of the States as arbitrator and guarantor. A condition is a reform of the central 
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and devolved administrative fisheries departments, so as to be more effective (debureaucratisation 
and fight against corruption). 
 
4.1. A new approach to fisheries governance  
 
56.  Generally speaking, one is witnessing a recognition of the importance of the governance which 
leads to a new, more open concept of fisheries management. Indeed, the concept of governance not only 
makes it possible to discuss the role of the administration in the process of resolution of issues of a public 
nature , but also of the contribution which can be brought by other stakeholders in this process (communities 
of residents, communities of fishermen, NGOs, private agents). This recognition comes within a tendency to 
the decentralization of the authority and responsibility for renewable natural resources management, in 
particular with an aim of obtaining a firmer engagement of civil society in the decisionmaking process. The 
ecosystemic approach adopted as analytical framework by the Convention on Biological Diversity also 
recognises the importance of social, cultural, economic and institutional factors for the promotion of the 
nature conservation and invites to decentralise as much as possible the management of fisheries in particular. 
 
57.  However, the governance concept which is highlighted in the International Conventions does not 
inevitably correspond to the various social and institutional conditions characterizing the fisheries in 
developing countries. Indeed, its very general character gives rise to a re-appropriation either authoritarian, by 
the States preoccupied with the preservation of a political and economic control on the exploitation of 
fisheries resources, or “autochtonist” by the native societies with the objective to extend their territorial 
control to the detriment of other groups. This situation tends to create permanent tensions between vertical 
and horizontal modes of coordination. 
 
58.  Thus, the development of governance models, appropriate to the fisheries, needs the construction 
of an adequate analytical framework. The latter could be based on the conceptual knowledge of the 
governance of hazardous activities, on the application of this knowledge to the environmental governance, 
and on the characterization of this governance in terms of political economy and political science. 
 
59.  Focussing specifically on the governance of hazardous activities initiated by the European 
Commission within the fourth Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development at the 
end of the 1990s
3
, allowed a notable conceptual progress which essentially consisted in making a distinction 
between two models of governance: one is characterized by the “top-down” paradigm and the other by the 
“mutual trust” paradigm. For the participants in this programme, each model is also characterized by its own, 
implicit “rules of the game”. The government authorities, the experts and the stakeholders play a different 
part in it. In the same way, each model is defined by its own types of regulation and ethical values. 
 
60.  The first paradigm, known as “top-down paradigm”, stresses the central role of government 
authorities in the process of evaluation and risk management. Protectors of the general interest, the authorities 
work out in a centralised way specific prescriptive regulations for each type of risk in each context. The 
government authorities require optimal solutions, legitimized by the scientific knowledge. 
 
61.  The second paradigm known as of “mutual trust” puts forward the role of stakeholders in the 
definition and management of the common good. They take part, in a way as broad as possible, in the 
decentralized decision-making processes, previously defined by government authorities. These processes 
have a procedural dimension, which implies that the scientific knowledge, opened to all of the stakeholders, is 
not presented any more like the principal factor of decision. 
3 The Programme TRUSTNET which took place from 1997 to 1999 
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62.  For the participants in the above mentioned programme, the complementarity of the two 
approaches is essential. The “top-down” approach is effective in contexts where the decision-making process 
is not complex. The approach in terms of “mutual trust” is necessary for any context marked by uncertainty 
and complexity. Finally, the case studies in the field of hazardous activities show that the two forms of 
governance are often mixed up. 
 
63.  One author went back to this distinction established in the field of hazardous activities and applied 
it to the environmental governance (Froger, 2001). She insists on the chronological succession of the two 
paradigms, the evolutions of the environment policies in contexts having shown the incapacity of the model 
of the top-down governance to control in a correct way the access to natural resources. 
 
64.  According to this author, the top-down paradigm, which grants a considerable weight to the public 
decision, was justified in the historical context of the Welfare State, where the latter seemed to be the only 
guarantor for the general interest. In some ways one finds himself within an iterative model where the citizens 
can make pressure on the authorities only in a retroactive and indirect way, the State being indeed the only 
empowered institution to formulate arbitrations between short term and long term. 
 
65.  It is when the confidence in the Welfare State erodes in a durable way that the paradigm of the 
mutual trust stands out. That corresponds to a more “horizontal” model implicating the coordination of 
various stakeholders. The State tends to involve more stakeholders in the public decision-making, on which it 
does not have any more the absolute monopoly. In this model, the stakeholders take part in the decentralized 
decision-making processes and the arbitrations are carried out at various levels of consultation. The decision 
does not only belong any more to the authorities. One is engaged in the decision-making processes which are 
more procedural than iterative in order to better apprehend the complexity of the environmental phenomena 
and allow all of the social agents to define an acceptable ecological risk. 
 
66.  The governance, built around these two paradigms, can be characterized in terms of political 
science and political economy so as to come close to a model privileging coordination among social agents. 
In such an approach, the objectives of the sustainable development can only be achieved by joint actions led 
by the stakeholders, and the norms of sustainable development must be the subject of a process of social 
legitimacy. Thus, the environmental stakes require the implementation of a continuous process of negotiation 
among multiple stakeholders. It is the procedural dimension of collective processes of identification of 
environmental problems and decision-making which is asserted in such a theoretical scheme. However, to 
make effective the procedures of negotiation and coordination among stakeholders at various levels, it is 
essential that the State assumes its regulatory role. Moreover, the mutual trust among nonofficial agents is not 
obvious. It supposes that the State could be the guarantor for the decisions negotiated by the different 
stakeholders. Thus, to face the challenges of the sustainable development, it is necessary to find the ground 
between a vertical model and a horizontal one. The policies relating to sustainable development can only be 
effective by combining these two paradigms in a way adapted to the context of exercise of the environmental 
governance. 
 
67.  The combination of a vertical and horizontal approach appears very relevant to fisheries 
governance in West Africa. It offers, indeed, interesting opportunities of treatment of contradictions inherent 
to the implementation of a regulation of fisheries resources exploitation, on the basis both of an administrated 
model and of a decentralized model of management. One can note in fact that the management of the West 
African fisheries oscillate with varying degrees between these two models. Even if a “participative model”, 
particularly in vogue in the international organisations dealing with development, is the prevailing view, the 
fisheries are yet characterized by this duality. On one side one often notes the absence of a regulating 
authority charged to promote the coherence in management and to arbitrate the conflicts which appear in the 
exploitation of fisheries resources: sometimes the top-down 
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paradigm seems to be neglected, indeed even wiped out, by the modes of intervention of the international 
special interest groups. On the other side, one observes some hesitation of national institutions to fully 
delegate their competences in fisheries resources management to the local institutions: the paradigm of mutual 
trust cannot assert itself if there is not a sufficient questioning of the administrative authorities. 
 
68.  A combination of the top-down paradigm and the mutual trust paradigm should make it possible to 
arrive at a transparent and equitable governance. This combination would permit a compensation for the 
deficit of regulation of conflicts relating to the access to fisheries resources and the inconsistencies of 
management, knowing that the actions of special interest groups tend to erode the capacity of regulation of the 
State, and in particular its arbitration function. By reinforcing the community authorities, the special interest 
groups are not very preoccupied with the balance of powers within communities or between communities. In 
this way, they do not contribute much to a possible articulation between the two paradigms of governance 
(top-down and mutual trust), and tend to privilege a conservationist approach to the detriment of a broader 
conception of sustainable development while not bringing the necessary means to compensate the restrictions. 
 
4.2. The integration of fisheries or aquaculture development assistance programmes into national and 
regional public policies 
 
69.  On a national scale, the integration of the fisheries development assistance programmes to the 
national public policies is essential, taking into consideration the very sectorial nature of these programmes. It 
is advisable to integrate these programmes into the global public policies on a national scale. This integration 
refers to the proclaimed objectives of which the most important are the poverty reduction, the environmental 
protection and sustainable development. 
 
70.  The integration of the fisheries development assistance into the national public policies is supposed 
to ensure the complementarity among sectorial policies so as to avoid a lack of coherence of the economic 
policies. Given the multiplicity of the projects, the fisheries development assistance programmes should be 
articulated on a national scale within the poverty reduction strategy framework, specially since it is expected 
that the coastal areas concentrate a great number of development programmes. As an example, since 1998, 
Mauritania has belonged to the countries which benefit from the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Debt 
Initiative and so has an important opportunity for financing development programmes. Within this 
framework, the Mauritanian Government worked out in 2001 (on the basis of a broad national consultation) a 
“Poverty Reduction Strategy Framework by 2015” which constitutes the reference document for economic 
and social development policy of the country. The present challenge of the country is to reduce significantly 
the poverty, while bringing back its incidence to a rate of 12% by 2015 and by mitigating its most degrading 
impacts. 
 
71.  The integration, which should also be done with the environmental protection and sustainable 
development policies, would contribute to the de-compartmentalization between the policies of conservation 
and those of development. It could favour a legal harmonization of enforcement actions and regulation of the 
access, a redefinition of the role of certain institutions, a limitation of competition among administrative 
departments. The National Strategy of the Environment and Sustainable Development in Mauritania (UNDP, 
2004) was elaborated in 2004. It was decided that it would take a double form: a National Strategy of 
Sustainable Development and a National Action Plan for the Environment and the Sustainable Development. 
The first, the National Strategy of Sustainable Development concentrates simultaneously on the global 
rationale of sustainable development, on the highlighting of stakes on a national scale and the nature of their 
interdependences, on the need for articulating in a coherent way this objective within the reference framework 
for the development of the country worked out in 2000 i.e. the Poverty Reduction Strategy Framework. From 
the point of view of the temporal scales, this National Strategy of Sustainable Development represents a 
vision over ten years and, thus, is adjusted to the year 
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2015 as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Framework and the Millennium Development Goals. The second, the 
National Action Plan for the Environment and the Sustainable Development, aims, on the basis of diagnosis 
of the state of the environment in Mauritania and of its management, to identify, to formulate and to plan all 
of the actions necessary for implementing an environmental policy in conformity with the concept of 
sustainable development. It lists the priority axes defined by the National Strategy of Sustainable 
Development in the form of operational objectives, principal activities, mechanisms and deadlines of 
implementation. It falls under medium term, five years, and so comprises only actions being able to be carried 
through to a successful conclusion during this period. 
 
72.  The integration, on a regional scale, starting from the fisheries development assistance 
programmes to the public policies expresses itself in terms of articulation in a coherent way of each 
programme with the regional public policies, but also in terms of coordination of the various programmes. 
 
73.  For the programmes relating to the fisheries to be applied with the regional public policies it 
requires to transcend from the narrow national framework. Difficulties of various nature are opposed to it: the 
absence of harmonization of institutional frameworks, the disparity of natural resources conservation policies, 
or even the obstacles to the economic integration. An example of an efficient articulation of the management 
programmes with the regional public policies, of which the fisheries could be inspired, is the support program 
to the integrated management of natural resources of Niger and Gambia Basins, which plans to speed up the 
harmonisation of the forestry legislations of the different countries as well as the harmonisation of control and 
regulation mechanisms of the forest products cross-border flows. 
 
74.  The weakness of the regional coordination regarding the management of marine and coastal 
protected areas results in the absence of regulation mechanisms applicable to cross-border migratory 
movements as to those related to the small-scale fishery between Saloum Delta and Bijagos Arquipelago, or 
those relating to the fishing and the smoking of ethmaloses between Guinea and Bijagos Archipelago. A true 
coordination passes through a constant and framed co-operation among States. To this end, the Sub-Regional 
Fishery Commission (SRFC) could take part in the mutualisation of all of these interests, under condition of 
reinforcement of the limited resources and powers they have at their disposal. This cooperation can also be 
carried out in network, in the image of that carried out by the specialized organizations within the framework 
of the regional Programme of conservation of the coastal and marine zone in West Africa (PRCM) on the 
initiative of international NGOs and intergovernmental organizations. 
 
4.3. The rehabilitation of the fisheries administration and the strengthening of institutions 
 
75.  The requalification of the role of the State in its functions of arbitrator and guarantor aims at 
compensating for a certain marginalization of administrative departments and their loss of legitimacy in a 
context characterized by the dominating role of international organisations. One understands, by international 
organisations, the international NGOs (IUCN, WWF, Wetlands International etc…) and the international 
institutions (World Bank, ADB, UNDP, UNEP, FAO etc…). Indeed, for a few years, these organisations have 
carried their financial effort mainly on the reinforcement of specific groups, such as socio-professional 
organisations or social associations which are constituted in special interest groups. These international 
organisations try to limit the weight of a governance system based on the top-down paradigm by setting up 
and supporting fishers, fish traders or traditional processors organisations. Thus, the analysis of the West 
African fisheries governance revealed the disproportionate role of special interest groups. Concomitantly, one 
attends the weakening of administrative departments which is prejudicial insofar as it prevents the rise of a 
management of a public nature. 
 
76.  The necessary articulation of the various power and decision levels leads to requalify the role of 
the State in the fisheries governance. For example, the strong mobility of fishing activities on the West 
African littoral supposes to go beyond the local framework and to consider the interactions among fisheries 
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at local, national and regional level. In fact the States have the adequate mediatory institutions at a national 
level or can delegate to regional institutions, like the Sub-Regional Fishery Commission (SRFC). Indeed, the 
underlining of interactions among fishers communities requires an implementation of consultation 
mechanisms as well as regulations at a regional level. Particularly since the regional integration of public 
policies pose some problems due to the disparity of regional institutional frameworks (CEDEAO and 
UEMOA), to the lack of application of regulations, or even to the inefficiency of some regional institutions 
(Dahou et al., 2003). 
 
77.  The State is in charge of the mediatory institutions not only in terms of scale (local, national, 
regional) but also in terms of timing. The concept of sustainability resulting from the International 
Conventions is precisely based on the articulation of the short and the long term. It is a question of being able 
to perpetuate the livelihoods of communities depending on the exploitation of fisheries resources, while 
ensuring the reproduction of the resources in the long term. (Morand and al., 2005; Allison and Horemans, 
2006). This idea also conveys a principle of fairness in the allocation of resources over generations. It is the 
State, after having engaged a process of negotiation, which has the legitimacy to carry out these decisions on 
a long term and which can ensure their efficiency through a budgetary planning. A multi-annual planning 
allows to join a short term objective, such as the reduction of poverty, and a long term objective, such as the 
restoration of fisheries resources. 
 
78.  Another reason for the requalification of the State is its potential role in the prospective and the 
implementation of sectorial arbitrations. At the national level, the public policies focused on fisheries have to 
refer to Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) which affirm the necessary complementarity between 
sectorial development policies and dictate the guidelines of development policies, including the fisheries 
sector. As long as these arbitrations will not be carried out by the States, it is difficult to imagine how the high 
level of exploitation of fisheries resources could decrease. Nevertheless, in order that these arbitrations would 
be effective, they must necessarily be based on consultation mechanisms, given the dead-ends of a 
governance system referring only to the top-down paradigm. This failure has been observed in the case of the 
European Union fisheries management, observing that the administrative departments of European States did 
not succeed in preserving the fisheries resources (Hatcher and Robinson 1999). It was also noticed in the case 
of marine protected areas management (Hilborn and al. 2004). In such a context, only procedures of 
governance referring to the paradigm of mutual trust are likely to re-legitimate the public actions and to 
reinforce the coherence of public policies. 
 
79.  Generally speaking, making up for the deficit of administrative legitimacy is conditioned by a 
greater efficiency of central and devolved administrative departments. A better efficiency induces a de-
compartmentalization of projects, a transparency of the procedures and a reduction in the national and 
international bureaucracy. These changes also require an evolution of administrative duties, currently too 
confined to control and enforcement. These duties must evolve in parallel to the programmes of local 
development and participatory management projects which induce an increase in manpower posted to 
fisheries administrative departments. Concomitantly, a significant effort regarding infrastructures have to be 
carried out. 
 
80.  The strengthening of the institutions can result in the creation of new institutions and in the setting 
up of new instruments of management. With the example of the Guinea-Bissau, the creation of new 
institutions, such as the National Institute of the Environment (INE) and the Institute of the Biodiversity of 
the Protected Areas (IBAP), must allow to focus the public policies on sustainable development and to 
reaffirm national sovereignty. 
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